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1329 
DOLLARS FOR VICTIMS OF A 
“VICTIMLESS” CRIME: 




Although often perceived as a “victimless crime,” drug use 
perpetuated by the illegal drug market continues to harm many 
members of society, with casualties including non-users as well 
as users themselves. Worse yet, criminals continue to experience 
massive profits as the drug trade within the United States 
generates revenues in excess of $65 billion per year.1 In 1992, 
former United States Attorney Daniel Bent proposed legislation 
that would provide third party plaintiffs with a civil remedy for 
injuries caused by the use of illegal drugs.2 Bent’s proposal 
gained notoriety after the American Legislative Exchange 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. The College of William and 
Mary, 2004. The author wishes to thank Prof. Jerome Leitner for his support 
and enthusiasm, as well as for permission to use any of the materials at his 
disposal. The author also wishes to thank Thomas Daniel for his incredible 
attitude and constant willingness to lend a helping hand.  
1 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL POLICY. WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS, 3 
(2001) available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf 
/american_users_spend_2002.pdf. 
2 Clinton W. Taylor, The Oklahoma Drug Dealer Liability Act: A Civil 
Remedy for a “Victimless” Crime, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 234 (1999) (citing 
Ill. Permits Suits Against Drug Dealers, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 28, 1995, at A8; 
Arnold Ceballos, New State Laws Let People Sue Drug Dealers, WALL ST. 
J., July 16, 1996, at B1). 
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Council3 adopted the model statute.4 Legislators took notice, and 
since 1994, fifteen jurisdictions have enacted legislation 
imposing civil liability on drug dealers.5 These laws, collectively 
referred to as Drug Dealer Liability Acts (“DDLAs”), allow 
third parties to bring a civil action against a drug dealer after 
suffering harm at the hands of a drug user. For example, under 
Oklahoma’s Drug Dealer Liability Statute, a parent-plaintiff 
could sue a defendant for damages on grounds that the plaintiff’s 
son committed suicide while under the influence of drugs 
provided by the defendant. 
While embraced by legislators and voters, drug dealer 
liability statutes have been criticized by some legal scholars for 
circumventing the due process clause, violating fundamental 
principles of tort law, and, in some cases, infringing upon 
defendants’ protection against double jeopardy.6 Specifically, 
critics of drug dealer liability statutes take issue with the relaxed 
causation requirements and imposition of a civil sanction after 
some defendants suffer a criminal penalty.7 
Despite such criticisms, however, drug dealer liability 
statutes should be held constitutionally valid. Legislators have 
                                                          
3 The American Legislative Exchange Council is a national law reform 
organization consisting of over 2,500 bipartisan state legislators. 
4 Taylor, supra note 2. 
5 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16.124.102-112 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 11700-30 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-801 (1998); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 772.12 (West Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-46 (West 
2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663 D-14 (LexisNexis 2006); 740 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 57/1-85 (West Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-70-
1-20 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.61-.76 (2006); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1601-19 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-15 
(West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2-424-34 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 44-54-10-140 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20-C1 (2006); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37E-1-14 (West 2006); 19 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 641-58 
(2006). 
6 See, e.g., Wendy Stasell, “Shopping” for Defendants: Market Liability 
Under the Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1023 
(1996); Joel W. Baar, Let the Drug Dealer Beware: Market Share Liability in 
Michigan for the Injuries Caused by the Illegal Drug Market, 32 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 139 (1997). 
7 Baar, supra note 6. 
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enacted drug dealer liability statutes primarily in an effort to 
provide victims of the illegal drug market with a remedy, as 
well as to deter people from engaging in such harmful criminal 
activity.8 Furthermore, traditional tort principles tolerate 
legislation that provides a statutory remedy designed to repair 
injustice inherent in the common law.9 In fact, even before the 
first drug dealer liability statute was enacted, state courts held 
that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, was best equipped 
to address the public policy interest of providing a compensation 
system for plaintiffs for whom it is difficult to prove causation.10 
Last, in terms of the double jeopardy issue, the Supreme Court 
has departed from its previous position on civil sanctions that 
serve deterrent purposes.11 In Hudson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court abandoned the notion that a sanction acting to 
deter criminal conduct was a criminal punishment per se, and 
instead required “the clearest proof” that the legislators intended 
a civil penalty to act as a criminal punishment before 
determining a statute to be in violation of the Constitution’s 
Double Jeopardy Clause.12 
This Note focuses on the constitutionality of DDLAs and 
how such statutes parallel traditionally accepted principles of tort 
law. Part I explains why common-law tort principles are unable 
to provide a satisfactory civil remedy against drug dealers. Part 
II provides a detailed description of the Model Drug Dealer 
Liability Act (“MDDLA”), as proposed by former United States 
Attorney Bent, and the case law that serves as the foundation for 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 740 s 57/5 (West 2006). 
9 See, e.g., Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209 (Wis. 1911) (holding 
that the legislature may constitutionally abolish certain defenses available at 
common law as a matter of public policy). 
10 Case v. Fireboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987) (holding that 
while there were policy reasons for allowing a victim of asbestos to recover 
against a number of asbestos companies without proving direct causation, the 
court should allow the legislature to create a civil remedy for such victims 
rather than create one on its own). 
11 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997) (overturning United States v. 
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)). 
12 Id. at 100 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)). 
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its risk-oriented approach to market share liability. Part III 
addresses the constitutional challenges to the MDDLA and 
explains why the MDDLA is constitutionally valid. Finally, this 
Note reviews the arguments in support of DDLAs and discusses 
the appropriateness of such legislation in light of the driving 
forces behind drug dealers’ decisions to participate in the illegal 
drug market. 
I.  DIFFICULTIES FOR VICTIMS OF THE ILLICIT DRUG TRADE 
UNDER COMMON-LAW TORT PRINICPLES 
Under the common law, plaintiffs in a negligence action 
must prove four traditional elements: duty, breach, cause, and 
harm.13 Additionally, plaintiffs must also contend with the 
affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk.14 Three of the elements of a negligence claim—duty, 
breach, and harm—are relatively easy for plaintiffs to prove 
when suing a drug dealer for damages. In terms of duty, state 
and federal legislators have deemed the distribution of illicit 
drugs illegal, thereby reflecting each person’s obligation not to 
engage in such behavior.15 Breach of this duty can easily be 
demonstrated by either a conviction under the relevant drug 
distribution statutes or a showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant distributed illicit drugs. Harm may 
also be shown easily where there is evidence of destruction of 
property while under the influence of narcotics, the death of a 
loved one due to an overdose, or other evidentiary bases of 
damages. 
Establishing the requisite causal connections, however, is 
more difficult. In order to prove causation, tort law requires that 
there be a reasonable connection between the defendant’s act or 
omission and the harm suffered.16 Plaintiffs may satisfy this 
                                                          
13 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). 
14 Id., § 65, at 451. 
15 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West. 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.021 
(West 2006). 
16 KEETON ET. AL, supra note 13, § 41, at 263. 
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element by showing that the defendant’s actions constituted a 
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm.17 In order to 
meet this burden, it is critical that the plaintiff be able to 
identify the defendant as the tortfeasor.18 In other words, 
because mere speculation as to the defendant’s role in causing 
the harm is insufficient under traditional principles of tort law,19 
the plaintiff must show that the defendant either supplied the 
drug user with drugs himself or, alternatively, that he played a 
substantial factor in supplying the specific drug user with illicit 
drugs. 
The nature of the illicit drug industry makes it difficult for 
plaintiffs to identify a drug user’s dealer. Rather than conduct 
transactions with large-scale dealers who possess considerable 
assets, drug users often interact with small-level dealers and 
have little knowledge of the bigger players within the chain of 
distribution. Consequently, third-party plaintiffs and drug users 
alike have a difficult time identifying a defendant within the 
drug chain capable of satisfying an adequate award.20 
Further problems arise despite a plaintiff’s ability to identify 
a large-scale drug dealer in some instances. For example, if a 
defendant with considerable assets is convicted of illicit drug 
distribution, his identity may become known to the potential 
plaintiff, but the plaintiff will need to demonstrate that the harm 
was foreseeable and that the doctrine of superseding cause is not 
applicable.21 The foreseeability doctrine forces plaintiffs to 
confront the obstacle of no “negligence in the air” as explained 
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.22 The Palsgraf court 
                                                          
17 Id. § 41, at 267. See also Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572, 575 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1954) (defining legal cause as conduct that is a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm providing there is no statute relieving the 
actor from liability). 
18 KEETON ET. AL, supra note 13, § 41, at 269. 
19 Id. 
20 Kevin G. Meeks, From Sindell to Street Pushers: Imposing Market 
Share Tort Liability on Illegal Drug Dealers, 33 GA. L. REV. 315, 326 
(1998). 
21 Id. at 327-28. 
22 248 N.Y. 339, 341 (1928). 
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held that a plaintiff must show that the defendant has breached a 
duty owed to himself rather than a violation of duty owed to 
someone else.23 Accordingly, courts follow the general rule that 
despite a defendant’s negligence, there is no duty owed to the 
unforeseeable plaintiff.24 Although a defendant convicted of 
distributing illicit drugs on a large scale may be negligent in a 
broad sense, it is difficult for plaintiffs to show, under common 
law tort principles, that the defendant was responsible for the 
distribution of the specific drugs used by the specific drug user 
who played a role in causing the harm suffered. Likewise, it is 
difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate that a reasonable person in 
the defendant’s position could have foreseen the harm suffered 
by a particular class of persons of which the plaintiff is a 
member. 
Furthermore, even if plaintiffs are able to overcome 
problems of foreseeability, they often fail to recover damages 
from a drug dealer on the grounds that the drug user’s conduct 
constituted a superseding cause25—the event which produces the 
resulting harm after the negligence of the defendant, thereby 
preventing the defendant from being held liable for his negligent 
conduct.26 
Under the common law, a drug dealer can be absolved of 
liability despite his negligence in the same way a bartender may 
be insulated from liability for the negligent acts of a tavern’s 
patrons: even where a bartender has been found negligent for 
serving alcohol to a patron, courts have traditionally denied 
recovery from the bartender or the tavern owner on the grounds 
                                                          
23 Id. at 343. But see, KEETON ET AL, supra note 13, § 36, at 224 
(stating that “the class of persons to be protected [by some statutes] may of 
course be a very broad one, extending to all those likely to be injured by the 
violation” and therefore, “a statute requiring druggists to label poisons, a 
pure food act, a law prohibiting the sale of firearms to minors, or an 
ordinance governing the servicing of gas lines, must clearly be intended for 
the benefit of any member of the public who may be injured by the act or 
thing prohibited.”). 
24 KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 43 at 285. 
25 See Meeks, supra note 20, at 327. 
26 KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, §44 at 301. 
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that the damages were too remote. Rather than the sale of 
alcohol, its consumption is typically viewed as the sole 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.27 
During the last quarter century however, many state 
legislatures have enacted Dram Shop Acts, thereby providing a 
civil remedy for plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from 
negligent alcohol vendors.28 Before Dram Shop legislation 
became prevalent, courts were unwilling to subject defendants to 
liability for negligently distributing alcohol because of 
insufficient statutory authority.29 It was not until the 1980s, 
when drinking and driving started to receive attention as a social 
issue, that legislatures began enacting expansive legislation 
providing courts with statutory authority for imposing tort 
liability for the negligent sale of alcohol.30 Today, forty-one 
states and the District of Columbia have Dram Shop 
legislation.31 Such legislation abrogates the common law’s 
proximate cause requirement and allows a third-party plaintiff to 
recover damages from parties who sell alcohol. Much like 
plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from drug dealers under 
common law principles of negligence, plaintiffs under Dram 
Shop Acts are barred from recovering damages against alcohol 
vendors if the legislatures did not provide such a statutory 
                                                          
27 Meeks, supra note 20, at 328 (citing Belding v. Johnson, 12 S.E. 304, 
305 (Ga. 1890)). 
28 See generally, Richard Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop 
Liability and a Proposal for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553 (2000). 
29 Id. at 555 (citing Felder v. Butler, 438 A.2d 494, 499 (Md. 1981); 
Holmes v. Circo, 244 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Neb. 1976); Williamson v. Old 
Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 624 (Va. 1986)). 
30 Id. at 556 (citing McIsaac v. Monte Carlo Club, Inc., 587 So. 2d 320, 
324 (Ala. 1991)). 
31 Sean A. O’Connor, Last Call: The South Carolina Supreme Court 
Turns Out the Lights on First-Party Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Against 
Tavern Owners, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1095, 1100, 1999 (commenting on South 
Carolina’s reluctance to allow intoxicated persons who have played a role in 
causing a third-party plaintiff’s harm from recovering under the State’s Dram 
Shop Act) (citing El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. 
1987)). 
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remedy.32 Dram Shop liability has been accepted as a legislative 
solution for the dilemma faced by third parties who have 
suffered harm at the hands of intoxicated parties and negligent 
alcohol vendors—a remedy that is consistent with the judiciary’s 
notion that such questions are better addressed by the 
legislature.33 
While Dram Shop Acts serve as a good example of how and 
why the legislature may help resolve inequity resulting from 
common law tort principles, a drug dealer liability statute 
written to mirror Dram Shop Acts would fail to provide a 
solution to the causation problems that plaintiffs face under 
common law tort principles. The critical shortfall of such a 
legislative scheme would be that it would require plaintiffs to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s 
drugs were the same drugs used by the party who injured the 
plaintiff. Despite this shortcoming, some legal scholars have 
suggested that DDLAs should parallel Dram Shop Acts.34 Under 
this legislative proposal, dubbed “Gram Shop Liability,” a third 
party could recover from a drug dealer if she proved “1) that the 
drug dealer’s illegal drugs were used by the party who injured 
her, and 2) that these drugs contributed to the party’s action that 
resulted in her injury.”35 Admittedly, these requirements would 
help plaintiffs overcome the prohibition on recovery for 
“negligence in the air” handed down by Palsgraf,36 but as 
discussed earlier, the nature of the illicit drug market makes it 
difficult, and in some cases nearly impossible, for plaintiffs to 
                                                          
32 Meeks, supra note 20, at 328. 
33 See Case v. Fireboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987); see also, 
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 181 (1984), discussion infra notes 
98-114 (holding that departing from common law principles to provide a 
method of recovery for an injured plaintiff was more acceptable than 
permitting a negligent defendant to escape liability). 
34 See, e.g. Michael E. Bronfin, “Gram Shop” Liability: Holding Drug 
Dealers Civilly Liable for Injuries to Third Parties and Underage Purchasers, 
1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 345 (1994). 
35 Id. at 353. 
36 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 248 N.Y. 339, 341 
(1928). 
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identify high-level drug dealers as the persons who constituted a 
substantial factor in the resulting injury.37 Therefore, while 
“Gram Shop Liability” is appealing because DDLAs would 
more closely adhere to traditional common law tort principles, 
thereby minimizing constitutional scrutiny, such legislation 
would do little, if anything, to provide plaintiffs with a solution 
to the causation problems faced under the common law’s 
negligence doctrine. 
To summarize, plaintiffs seeking to recover damages as a 
result of a drug dealer’s negligence are barred from recovery 
under common law tort principles. Despite the duty not to 
engage in the distribution of illicit drugs, the obvious breach of 
this duty upon conviction of a crime or other evidentiary 
grounds, and the significant harm that the illegal drug trade 
regularly inflicts upon third parties, the illegality of drug dealing 
requires drug dealers to maintain anonymity and, as a result, 
precludes many potential plaintiffs from demonstrating 
causation. As the popularity of Dram Shop Acts indicates, our 
legal system has embraced legislative efforts to remedy injustices 
resulting from instances in which the common law’s tort 
principles prevent plaintiffs from recovering damages from 
negligent defendants. However, this does not necessarily imply 
that “Gram Shop Liability” is an appropriate solution. Rather, in 
the vast majority of cases, “Gram Shop Liability” would fail to 
provide any assistance to plaintiffs seeking to recover from drug 
dealers as the proposal requires plaintiffs to prove that the drug 
dealer supplied drugs to the party whose conduct formed the 
basis for the plaintiff’s suit.38 
Although this approach would limit the constitutional 
arguments against DDLAs, it is an inadequate measure for 
achieving the original goal of such a statute—helping plaintiffs 
overcome the causation obstacles under the common law’s tort 
doctrine. Accordingly, fifteen jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation based upon the MDDLA in an effort to provide 
plaintiffs who have suffered harm as a result of the illicit drug 
                                                          
37 Meeks, supra note 20. 
38 See Bronfin, supra note 34, at 353. 
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trade with a remedy while ensuring that such legislation adheres 
to constitutional principals.39 
II.  THE MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY STATUTE 
Although fifteen different jurisdictions have enacted drug 
dealer liability statutes,40 each jurisdiction closely follows the 
provisions set forth in the Model Drug Dealer Liability Act 
(“MDDLA”), which has been adopted by the American 
Legislative Exchange Council.41 For this reason and for 
purposes of efficiency, this Note focuses primarily on the 
MDDLA’s language, while intermittently referring to statutes 
enacted by Illinois, Michigan, South Dakota, and Oklahoma as 
representative samples of current legislation based upon the 
MDDLA.42 
A.  Who May Recover Under the MDDLA 
Potential plaintiffs under the MDDLA include relatives of 
drug users, injured members of the public, and others that have 
incurred a financial loss as a result of the person’s drug use.43 
Although drug users may bring suit themselves, unless the user 
is a minor, a drug-user’s voluntary decision to use drugs limits 
his recoverable damages.44 Admittedly, the notion that drug 
users should be able to recover any damages from drug dealers 
initially provokes a negative reaction. However, there are 
several policy reasons for including drug users among potential 
                                                          
39 Supra note 5. 
40 Id. 
41 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT (Daniel Bent 1996), available 
at http://www.modelddla.com /Model_ Act. htm. 
42 It should be noted that the first judgment rendered under a drug dealer 
liability statute, and the first state to enact such legislation, was in Michigan 
in the case of Ficano v. Clemens, No. 95-512918 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne 
C’ty. 1995), discussed infra notes 121-30. 
43 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(c). 
44 Id. § 7. 
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plaintiffs.45 
First and foremost, allowing users to bring suit under the 
MDDLA furthers the deterrent goal of the statute because such 
plaintiffs are in a particularly good position to identify drug 
dealers whose actions led to harm.46 Allowing such recovery 
provides an incentive for users to identify drug dealers and seek 
treatment for their addiction.47 Furthermore, only drug users 
who have never dealt drugs would likely bring a suit under the 
MDDLA because, if the plaintiff were a dealer, the defendant 
could file a counter-claim thereby making the suit even more 
incriminatory for the user.48 By creating severe penalties for 
drug distribution offenses and relatively minor criminal penalties 
for drug users who have no intent to distribute, legislators 
throughout the country have, appropriately, identified drug 
distribution as a more serious offense than using or possessing 
drugs.49 Accordingly, the idea that drug users may recover 
damages, albeit limited damages, from drug dealers is consistent 
with the criminal law’s distinction between these two classes of 
offenses. 
Notwithstanding these different criminal classifications, the 
MDDLA also recognizes that there is a significant distinction 
between drug users who have suffered injury at the hands of 
drug dealers, and third-party plaintiffs who are not themselves 
drug users and have suffered harm as a result of a drug dealer’s 
                                                          
45 Daniel Bent and Sharon Burnham, Imposing Products Liability for 
Illegal Drugs, http://www.modelddla.com/Imposing_Products_Liability_for_ 
Illegal_Drugs.htm (last visited April 10, 2007). 
46 Id. 
47 Meeks, supra note 20 at 351, n.104. 
48 Bent et al, supra note 45. 
49 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (West. 2006) (establishing minimum prison 
sentences of 10 years for a defendant’s first drug distribution offense, 20 
years if death or serious bodily injury occurs as a result of a defendant’s first 
drug distribution offense, 20 years if the defendant has prior drug distribution 
convictions, and life imprisonment if death or serious bodily injury occurs 
and the defendant has prior drug distribution convictions); but see, 21 
U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (West 2006) (establishing a maximum sentence of 1 year 
in prison for simple possession and up to two years if the defendant has prior 
possession convictions). 
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actions.50 As a result, the MDDLA limits the extent of damages 
user-plaintiffs may recover, and requires that several deterrence-
focused provisions be satisfied before the user may recover 
damages.51 For example, under the MDDLA a user-plaintiff 
must: 1) personally disclose to law enforcement, more than six 
months before filing the suit, all information he has regarding 
the source of illegal drugs; 2) refrain from using illegal drugs 
during the six months before filing the action; and 3) remain 
drug-free for the duration of the suit.52 Most significantly, user-
plaintiffs are barred from recovering non-economic damages.53 
Therefore, users are limited to recovery for pecuniary losses, 
including “the cost of treatment, rehabilitation, medical 
expenses, loss of economic or educational potential, loss of 
productivity, absenteeism, accidents or injury, and any other 
pecuniary loss proximately caused by the person’s illegal drug 
use.”54 Users may also seek award for the cost of the suit, 
including reasonable attorney fees and expenses for expert 
witnesses.55 Thus, although all plaintiffs are permitted to recover 
economic damages, public policy dictates that only plaintiffs 
who did not knowingly use drugs may recover non-economic 
damages.56 
Plaintiffs who do not knowingly use drugs are distinguished 
from voluntary drug users, however, and like third-party 
plaintiffs, may seek punitive and exemplary damages in addition 
to economic damages.57 For example, the drug user who 
knowingly sells crack to a pregnant mother, thereby injuring the 
mother and her unborn child, would likely be held liable for 
punitive or exemplary damages, but the child’s guardian would 
have to file suit on his behalf; the mother would not be eligible 
for punitive, exemplary, and other non-economic damages 
                                                          
50 See MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 7. 
51 Id. § 7(a). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. § 7(c). 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
56 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(c)(2). 
57 Id. § 6(c)(3). 
5NICK MOST LAST SECOND EDITS EVER.DOC 7/19/2007 8:44 PM 
 DEFENSE OF DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACTS 1341 
because she knowingly used drugs.58 
Put plainly, the MDDLA focuses upon harm to third parties 
and drug users stemming from drug dealers’ negligence.59 While 
the full range of recoverable damages is available for parties 
who incur injury at the hands of a drug user and for involuntary 
drug users, public policy argues against allowing voluntary drug 
users to recover non-economic damages.60 
B.  Expanding the Class of Defendants to Help Solve 
Causation Issues 
The MDDLA establishes two different classes of defendants 
from which plaintiffs may recover damages.61 Plaintiffs may 
bring suit against a party who knowingly distributed or 
participated in the distribution of an illegal drug that was used 
by the user.62 Alternatively, in an effort to expand the class of 
defendants, plaintiffs may file suit against a party who 
knowingly participated in the illegal drug market but who may 
have not necessarily distributed the drug used by the user.63 
Plaintiffs filing suit against the second class of defendants must 
demonstrate the following: that the defendant distributed illegal 
drugs in the same target community as that in which the drug 
user used drugs, that the defendant distributed the same type of 
illegal drug as was used by the drug user, and that the defendant 
was engaged in the distribution of drugs during the same time 
period in which the user used drugs.64 In terms of causation 
                                                          
58 Bent et al., supra note 45. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b). 
62 Id. 
63 Bent et. al., supra note 45. 
64 Id. “Target community” is defined, at a minimum, as the state house 
legislative district in which the defendant’s conduct was located. However, 
this geographic area may expand in relation to the severity of the drug 
distribution activity. For example, a defendant whose participation in the 
illicit drug market constitutes a level 1 offense would be considered to have a 
target community of the state house legislative district in which his negligence 
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principles, there is little controversy, over the first class of 
defendants because the defendants in these cases knowingly 
distributed illegal drugs, the use of which forms the basis of 
recovery. However, legal scholars take issue with the second set 
of potential defendants because the causal connection is relaxed 
in an effort to overcome the obstacles plaintiffs face when 
attempting to identify members of the illicit drug trade 
community.65 
While it must be conceded that the MDDLA permits a 
plaintiff to impose liability upon a defendant who may not have 
actually provided drugs to the individual whose use forms the 
basis of recovery, critics of the MDDLA lose sight of the fact 
that the legislation serves as a statutory solution toward the 
difficult task of providing victims of the illegal drug trade with a 
remedy.66 It is the legislature’s responsibility to assist plaintiffs 
who have suffered a distinct harm but who have difficulty either 
identifying the correct defendant against whom to bring an 
action, or demonstrating that the defendant, while having clearly 
committed a tortious act, committed the specific act leading to 
the particular plaintiff’s harm.67 
Throughout our legal system, legislatures have helped 
plaintiffs overcome obstacles particular to the common law’s 
principles of negligence.68 The wide-spread enactment of 
workers’ compensation statutes serves as a clear example of how 
legislatures help plaintiffs who have suffered harm to recover 
damages despite clear hindrances presented by the common 
                                                          
occurred, whereas a defendant whose conduct constituted a level 2 offense 
would be considered to have a target community of the state house legislative 
district in which his negligence occurred plus all legislative districts with 
borders adjacent to the district in which his negligence took place. Defendants 
meeting the criteria for a level 3 offense would be considered to have a target 
community of the districts included for level 2 defendants, plus all districts 
with borders adjacent to the level 2 borders. Finally, level 4 defendants are 
considered to have a target community of the entire state. MODEL DRUG 
DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 9. 
65 See Stasell, supra note 6. 
66 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41 § 2. 
67 Case v. Fireboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987). 
68 See supra notes 9-11, and accompanying text. 
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law.69 
Workers’ compensation acts were created to combat the very 
limited tort liability of employers to their employees under the 
common law.70 Traditional common law provided a relatively 
low level of liability for employers because labor opportunities 
were in high supply, and therefore, employees could seek work 
under a different employer if their current working conditions 
were not safe or adequate.71 Before workers’ compensation acts 
became common, employees were often limited by the “unholy 
trinity” of common law defenses—contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.72 This trio of 
common law defenses often meant that a “momentary lapse of 
caution on the part of the worker was penalized by casting the 
entire burden of his injury upon him, in the face of continued 
and greater negligence of the employer.”73 Courts were 
unwilling to change the common law rules by themselves, and 
instead awaited reform from the legislatures.74 Recognizing the 
injustices faced by injured employees under the common law, 
legislatures rapidly began passing workers’ compensation acts.75 
Today, all fifty states have workers’ compensation acts and “it 
has been said that no subject of labor legislation ever has made 
such progress or received such general acceptance of its 
principles in so brief a period.”76 
State legislatures that have enacted the MDDLA in response 
to the needs of victims of the illegal drug trade have acted in 
accord with the legislative rationale behind the passage of 
workers’ compensation acts. In both instances, the legislatures 
identified a negligent defendant who inappropriately escapes 
                                                          
69 Discussed infra notes 189-98. 
70 KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, §80, at 568. 
71 Id. 
72 Id., §80 at 569. 
73 Id., §80 at 570. 
74 Id., §80 at 573. 
75 Id. 
76 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, § 80, at 573 (5th ed. 1984) (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statisitcs, 
Bull. No. 126, 1913, p. 9). 
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liability under common law principles. Legislators have taken 
notice that traditional common law principles of negligence fail 
to consider the nuances of the illegal drug trade and have found 
a solution in a statute with less stringent causation requirements. 
Therefore, while critics of the MDDLA contend that the statute 
is a departure from traditional tort law and compromises 
fundamental principles of justice,77 the notion that the legislature 
may, and should, create a remedy for plaintiffs who have been 
injured but who are barred from recovery under the common 
law is an established principle of legislative behavior. 
C.   Standard of Proof 
The MDDLA requires that the plaintiff prove the defendant’s 
participation in the illegal drug market by “clear and convincing 
evidence.”78 All other elements of the cause of action require 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.79 However, if a 
defendant has a conviction under either state drug laws or the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970, he or she is collaterally estopped from denying 
participation in the illegal drug market.80 
Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still demonstrate that the 
defendant was engaged in the distribution of drugs during the 
same time period in which the user used drugs.81 Under the 
MDDLA, a drug distribution-offense conviction serves as prima 
facie evidence of participation in the illegal drug market for the 
two years preceding the date of the conduct that leads to the 
suit.82 This provision allows plaintiffs to determine how long a 
defendant has been involved in the market.83 Although 
defendants who have previously been convicted of drug 
distribution offenses are estopped from denying participation in 
                                                          
77 Stasell, supra note 6, at 1024. 
78 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 13(a). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. § 13(b). 
81 Id. § 6(b). 
82 Id. 
83 Bent et al., supra note 45, n.45. 
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the illegal drug market, they may nonetheless offer evidence to 
show that they did not engage in the distribution of illicit drugs 
during the time period in question, thereby avoiding liability 
under the MDDLA. Additionally, the absence of a criminal drug 
conviction does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing suit 
against a defendant.84 
D.  Imposing Liability under the MDDLA: Market Share 
Liability 
Market share liability theory serves as one of the central 
methods for imposing liability on defendants brought into court 
under the MDDLA.85 The following subsections describe the 
circumstances leading to the creation of market share liability, 
the public policy arguments in favor of implementing market 
share liability, and the recent developments in market share 
liability theory utilized by the MDDLA. Most significantly, just 
as it is used for plaintiffs under the MDDLA, market share 
liability was created to help injured plaintiffs overcome the 
causation difficulties present when bringing suit against negligent 
defendants.86  
1.  The Origins of Market Share Liability 
Market share liability originated primarily with plaintiffs 
who suffered harm at the hands of pharmaceutical companies. In 
Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, the California Supreme Court 
created market share liability to provide a remedy for a plaintiff 
who suffered prenatal injuries as a result of her mother ingesting 
the drug diethylstilbestrol (“DES”).87 Although the plaintiff in 
Sindell suffered a distinct and easily demonstrable harm, it was 
                                                          
84 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 13(a). 
85 Daniel Bent, Market Share Liability Further Explained, available at 
http://www.modelddla.com/Market_Liability_Further_Explained.htm (last 
visited April 25, 2007).  
86 See Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611 (1980); 
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 166 Wis. 2d 166, 181 (1984).  
87 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d. at 588. 
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unclear as to which drug manufacturing company had produced 
the DES that led to the plaintiff’s injuries. Because of the 
intricacies of the drug manufacturing business, it was impossible 
for the plaintiff to prove with any certainty which drug 
manufacturer produced the DES that her mother ingested.88 The 
Sindell court’s decision was of particular importance to the 
MDDLA because it created market share liability to enable a 
plaintiff to recover from defendants who had clearly committed 
tortious acts despite being unable to demonstrate that those acts 
were the proximate causes of her injuries.89 Sindell shifted the 
burden of proof to the defendant to show that it did not produce 
the DES that injured the plaintiff, thereby allowing the 
defendants to exculpate themselves.90 
The central tenet of the market share liability theory 
developed in Sindell is that defendants were to be held liable in 
proportion to the percentage of DES that each had sold in 
relation to the entire amount sold by all defendants.91 
Accordingly, any defendant found liable in Sindell was 
responsible for paying its market share portion of the total 
damage award.92 This theory of assigning liability was 
developed in part to provide a remedy for a plaintiff who had 
suffered harm at the hands of negligent defendants, and was in 
lieu of a more precise and accurate method for determining 
defendants’ liability.93 Critics of market share liability contend 
that under the Sindell rationale, defendants may be held liable 
for harm they did not cause,94 but the California Supreme Court, 
in defense of its decision, explained that “as between an 
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear 
the cost of the injury.”95 
                                                          
88 Id. at 596. 
89 Id. at 610. 
90 Id. at 611. 
91 See Id. at 611-13. 
92 See Id. 
93 Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d. 588, 615-16 (Cal. 1980). 
94 Andrew B. Nace, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of a 
Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395, 434 (1991). 
95 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11. 
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Sindell was not the first time the California Supreme Court 
relaxed a plaintiff’s evidentiary burden, however.96 The plaintiff 
in Summers v. Tice filed a negligence claim against two 
defendants after being shot in the eye during a hunting trip.97 
After conceding that contributory negligence was not an issue, 
and determining that one of the two defendants must have been 
the one responsible for the plaintiff’s injury, the Summers court 
held that the defendants, rather than the plaintiff, were obligated 
to offer affirmative proof of lack of causation in order to avoid 
liability.98 The court implemented a theory of alternative liability 
and explained: “when we consider the relative position of the 
parties and the results that would flow if plaintiff was required 
to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement 
that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants 
becomes manifest.”99 
2.  Public Policy Supports the Implementation of  
Market Share Liability 
As in Summers, the plaintiff in Sindell was not penalized for 
the lack of evidence of causation and, “although the absence of 
such evidence is not attributable to the defendants either, their 
conduct in marketing a drug, the effects of which are delayed 
for many years, played a significant role in creating the 
unavailability of proof.”100 The Sindell court articulated three 
policy reasons supporting the adoption of market share liability, 
all of which are fully applicable to the MDDLA: 1) the 
negligent defendant should bear the burden of an injury rather 
than the innocent plaintiff; 2) manufacturers have an incentive to 
improve product safety if subject to increased liability; and 3) 
drug manufacturers are in a better position to absorb the cost of 
the harm than the plaintiff.101 The court looked to Justice 
                                                          
96 See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
97 Id. at 82, 199 P. 2d at 2. 
98 Id. at 86, 199 P. 2d at 2.  
99 Id. 
100 Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611 (1980). 
101 Id. 
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Traynor’s opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,102 and 
recognized that “in an era of mass production and complex 
marketing methods the traditional standard of negligence [is] 
insufficient to govern the obligations of manufacturer to 
consumer, so we should acknowledge that some adaptation of 
the rules of causation and liability may be appropriate in these 
recurring circumstances.”103 
The Sindell court’s reasons for embracing market share 
liability are even stronger in the context of the MDDLA. As 
with plaintiffs who have suffered harm at the hands of 
pharmaceutical companies, plaintiffs bringing suit under the 
MDDLA have a difficult time identifying the specific dealer-
defendant who was responsible for providing the drug user with 
the drugs that formed the basis for recovery. More importantly, 
however, the criticisms of market share liability, as articulated 
with regard to litigation against pharmaceutical companies, are 
much weaker when applied to litigation against drug dealers. 
For example, several state courts have rejected market share 
liability theory in cases involving suits against drug 
manufacturers because of the detrimental effects such a system 
of liability would have upon the industry.104 This concern 
becomes irrelevant when courts or legislatures consider market 
share liability in the context of the illicit drug trade. As applied 
under the MDDLA, market share liability has the potential to 
aid in the ferrying out of crime since it will, at least 
theoretically, increase the cost of production for large scale 
illegal drug distributors. From an economic standpoint, an 
increase in the cost of production will decrease profits and 
eventually increase prices of narcotics, thereby serving as a 
deterrent to both individual dealers and to users who seek to 
                                                          
102 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944). 
103 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610. 
104 See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 261 (1990) 
(explaining that market share liability will increase the cost of production and 
therefore decrease research and development of advancements in 
pharmaceutical field); Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155 (1989) 
(holding that market share liability would cripple the pharmaceutical 
industry).  
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participate in drug distribution-related activity. 
3.  Recent Developments to Market Share Liability 
Market share liability is not a stagnant concept. After its 
creation in Sindell, a number of courts involved in DES 
litigation adopted the principle that market share liability should 
serve as a method for imposing liability upon negligent 
defendants.105 In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court modified the Sindell court’s theory of market 
share liability by focusing more upon the risk of harm created 
by the defendant.106 As in Sindell, the plaintiff in Collins 
suffered harm as a result of her mother’s ingestion of DES.107 
The Collins court determined that the plaintiff had suffered an 
apparent harm at the hands of a tortfeasor, but recognized that 
Collins was unable to identify the manufacturer of the DES 
ingested by her mother for three reasons: the drug’s generic 
form, the large number of producers and marketers of the drug, 
and the scarcity of records indicating specific DES production 
by individual manufacturers.108 When faced with the “choice of 
either fashioning a method of recovery for the DES case which 
[would] deviate from traditional notions of tort law, or 
permitting possibly negligent defendants to escape liability to an 
innocent, injured plaintiff,”109 the Collins court chose to depart 
from the common law principles of negligence in order to 
permit recovery on behalf of the plaintiff.110 
In defense of its choice to provide Collins with a remedy, 
the court explained: 
the common law is a dynamic principle which allows 
                                                          
105 See, e.g., McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (S.D. 
1983); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); 
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571 (1982); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co, 
116 Wis. 2d 166 (1984). 
106 Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 166. 
107 Id. at 174. 
108 Id. at 180. 
109 Id. at 181. 
110 Id. 
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it to grow and to tailor itself to meet the changing 
needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if 
correctly understood, was not static and did not 
forever prevent the courts from reversing themselves 
or from applying principles of common law to new 
situations as the need arose.111 
Nonetheless, the Collins court determined that the theories of 
alternative and market share liability developed in Summers and 
Sindell should not apply to Collins’ cause of action.112 With 
regard to alternative liability, the court reasoned that Collins, 
unlike the plaintiff in Summers, could never join all of the 
negligent defendants.113 To do so would require Collins to join 
every DES manufacturer who produced DES during the time 
period and within the geographic area in which Collins’s mother 
ingested the DES that led to Collins’s injuries. Further, after 
considering and ultimately rejecting Sindell’s version of market 
share liability, the Collins court explained that defining and 
proving a defendant’s market share is too difficult a task to 
require of plaintiffs given the lack of available records held by 
drug companies.114 
As a result, the Collins court developed its own version of 
market share liability based on the principle that “each defendant 
contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, consequently, 
the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs such as Therese 
Collins.”115 This theory of liability rests upon the idea that each 
defendant is responsible to a certain degree for producing or 
marketing a drug that has been determined to be dangerous.116 
The Collins court noted that manufacturers of harmful drugs 
                                                          
111 Id. at 182 (quoting Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11 (1962)). 
112 Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 184, 189 (1984) 
113 Id. at 184. 
114 Id. at 189. 
115 Id. at 191 (emphasis added). 
116 Id. See also, Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: 
Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982). The Collins court 
did not agree with Robinson’s theory, however, that contributing to the risk 
of harm by acting as a DES manufacturer was sufficient to subject a 
defendant to liability. 
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were in a better position to absorb the cost of liability because 
consumers and physicians normally base their decisions to use a 
drug on the information provided by the manufacturers, thereby 
leaving the consumers “virtually helpless to protect themselves 
from serious injuries caused by deleterious drugs.”117 
Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded the case 
and required the plaintiff to demonstrate that her injuries were 
caused by her mother’s ingestion of DES, that the defendant 
produced the same type of drug as her mother ingested, and that 
the defendant breached a legally recognized duty to the plaintiff 
by producing or marketing DES.118 
The Collins court’s formulation of a risk-oriented version of 
market share liability may also be imposed on defendants in 
MDDLA litigation. First, like the problems faced by the 
plaintiff in Collins, plaintiffs who suffer harm as a result of drug 
use have difficulty identifying negligent defendants capable of 
satisfying an adequate award. Because illicit drugs are often 
manufactured in generic form, there exists an indeterminable 
number of drug producers and dealers. Moreover, due in large 
part to the illegality of their trade, drug dealers keep few, if 
any, records of their business.119  
Second, the required elements for demonstrating liability 
under Collins parallel those of the MDDLA. Although plaintiffs 
under Collins and the MDDLA are not required to show that the 
defendant produced and/or distributed the exact drugs ingested 
by the drug user whose drug use formed the basis for 
recovery,120 plaintiffs in both contexts must demonstrate that the 
drug user used the same type of drug produced or marketed by 
the defendant. Third, much like the court’s reasoning in Collins, 
the MDDLA seeks to impose liability upon otherwise negligent 
defendants in an effort to provide a remedy for plaintiffs who 
have suffered a demonstrable harm.  
                                                          
117 Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 192-93 (Wis. 1984). 
118 Id. at 193. 
119 Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis 
of a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances 12-45 (American Bar Foundation, 
Working Paper No. 9814, 1999). 
120 Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 194. 
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Last, Collins and the MDDLA help further similar policy 
interests. The Collins court explained that a defendant may 
implead as many third-party defendants as possible in order to 
fairly distribute liability, so long as the original defendant can 
show that the additional defendants produced the same type of 
drug taken by the plaintiff’s mother which formed the basis for 
the plaintiff’s recovery.121 The MDDLA addresses similar policy 
concerns by permitting the joinder of additional defendants who 
may share liability, and creating an incentive for drug dealers 
who have been brought into court to disclose information that 
might be used to implicate additional defendants. 
To summarize, like plaintiffs in market share liability cases, 
plaintiffs under the MDDLA are not tortfeasors and seek civil 
remedies from negligent, and often times criminally culpable, 
defendants.122 Plaintiffs in such cases, through no fault of their 
own, have trouble proving causation. The Sindell court noted 
that the defendants were not principally to blame for the lack of 
causal evidence either, but that their conduct nonetheless played 
a factor in the deficiency of proof.123 Defendants, however, play 
a much larger role in the unavailability of evidence that may 
indicate their participation in the illicit drug trade. Because of 
the risks of arrest and incarceration, drug-dealer defendants 
often go to great lengths to eliminate any basis of proof of 
business transactions between themselves and drug users.  
As a result, plaintiffs under the MDDLA often have little 
evidence to offer showing a causal relationship between the 
defendant and the drug user, despite the defendant’s obvious 
criminal conduct. Therefore, despite market share liability 
serving as the foundation for holding defendants accountable 
under the MDDLA, the extent of a defendant’s liability is not 
based entirely upon the drug dealer’s share in the illicit drug 
market because such evidence is difficult to obtain. Instead, the 
                                                          
121 Id. at 195. 
122 See supra notes 50-58, and accompanying text. As discussed earlier, 
drug users themselves may also recover damages under the MDDLA, but 
members of this class of plaintiffs are severely limited in the types of 
damages they may seek. Bent et al., supra note 45.  
123 Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11 (1980) 
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MDDLA more closely embraces the risk-contribution version of 
market share liability developed in Collins and permits a 
negligent defendant to be held liable for the total amount of 
damages awarded. This results in an incentive for drug dealers 
to implead other drug dealers who contribute to the risk of drug 
use in the target community so that they may share liability, and 
also serves the overarching policy interest of deterring drug 
distribution while encouraging defendants to identify those who 
participate in the illegal drug market. 
E.   Notable Cases Brought Under Drug Dealer Liability 
Acts 
The first case filed under a state’s DDLA was in Michigan 
in the case of Ficano v. Clemens.124 In Ficano, two plaintiffs—
the estate of an infant, Felicia Brown, who was born addicted to 
cocaine and eventually killed by her drug-addicted mother, and 
the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department—brought suit against 
two convicted drug dealers.125 Felicia Brown was under-
developed as a result of her mother’s drug abuse and died as a 
result of her heavy exposure to cocaine.126 In 1995, the court 
entered a default judgment of $8.7 million against the two 
defendants.127 
This case highlights several interesting points. First, the 
infant’s estate, not her mother, brought suit with the Sheriff’s 
office.128 Instead of joining the lawsuit, Felicia Brown’s mother 
was on trial for her murder.129 She was eventually convicted of 
                                                          
124 No. 95-512918 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne C’ty. 1995). 
125 Stasell, supra note 6, at 1035-36 (citing Mediation Summary of 
Plaintiff Robert A. Ficano at 3, 8; Stephen Jones, Suit Targets 4 Drug 
Convicts for Damages in Tot’s Death, DET. FREE PRESS, May 3, 1995, at 
C3). 
126 Id. at 1036, n.87 (citing Mediation Summary of Plaintiff Robert A. 
Ficano at 5). 
127 Arnold Ceballos, New State Laws Let People Sue Drug Dealers, 
WALL ST. J., Jul. 16, 1996, at B1. 
128 See Stasell, supra note 6. 
129 Stasell, supra note 6, at 1066, n.87 (citing Mediation Summary of 
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second degree murder and received 15 to 25 years in prison.130 
Second, under Michigan’s DDLA, the plaintiffs in Ficano 
demonstrated liability by showing that the defendants had been 
convicted of selling drugs in the same target community as that 
in which the plaintiffs sustained harm.131 Nevertheless, while 
such a conviction served as prima facie evidence that the 
defendants participated in the distribution of illegal drugs for the 
two years before and the two years after the conviction,132 
defendants brought into court under any state’s DDLA, 
including Michigan’s, have the opportunity to rebut such 
presumptions based on criminal convictions if they show by 
clear and convincing evidence that they did not participate in the 
illegal drug market during the presumed time period.133 
A more recent case was filed under South Dakota’s 
DDLA.134 In Muhs v. Johnson, the plaintiff, Jean Muhs, sued 
Wayne Johnson for damages resulting from a motor vehicle 
accident.135 Muhs and her husband, Floyd, were driving along a 
highway when another car swerved into their lane and struck 
their vehicle.136 Floyd Muhs died at the scene of the accident, 
and Jean Muhs suffered serious injuries, including a broken 
neck, legs, and back.137 Mrs. Muhs was unable to attend her 
husband’s funeral, could not speak clearly during the two to 
three weeks following the accident, had screws drilled into her 
head so that she could not move her neck, and could not walk 
                                                          
Plaintiff Alan A. May at 3). 
130 Ceballos, supra note 127. 
131 Stasell, supra note 6, at 1036 (citing Corey Williams, Ficano Seeks 
Assets of Drug Dealers in Beating Death of Child, DET. NEWS, May 9, 1995, 
at B4). 
132 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1609 (West 2006). 
133 Id. 
134 No. 99-2870 (S.D., Minnehaha C’ty Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000). 
135 American Trial Lawyers Assoc., Counsel Obtains Verdict Against 
Drug Dealer Whose customers Caused Fatal Automobile Wreck, LAW 
REPORTER, Vol. 43, No. 1 at 240 (2000). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
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for more than a year.138 The vehicle that swerved into Muhs’ 
lane was operated by Daniel Bolls.139 Following the accident, 
Bolls and his passenger, Carrie Ann Walker, were immediately 
tested for narcotics and the results indicated that both were 
under the influence of marijuana and methamphetamines.140 
Walker told police that she and Bolls had received the 
methamphetamine from the defendant, Wayne Johnson, earlier 
that morning.141 Although Walker and Bolls were charged with 
manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and ingestion of a controlled 
substance, Muhs filed suit against Wayne Johnson under South 
Dakota’s DDLA seeking recovery for medical expenses, loss of 
consortium, and punitive damages.142 
Unlike Ficano, the defendant in Muhs was represented in 
court.143 Even so, the jury awarded a total of $268.7 million to 
Muhs, $250 million of which constituted punitive damages.144 
Under South Dakota’s DDLA, Muhs was able to demonstrate 
liability by showing that Johnson provided Bolls and Walker 
with the drugs that caused them to swerve into Muhs’ lane and 
collide with her vehicle.145 Muhs, therefore, serves as an 
example of a suit against the first class of defendants included in 
the MDDLA—persons who knowingly distribute or participate in 
the distribution of an illegal drug, the use of which forms the 
basis of recovery.146 Unlike Ficano, many of the criticisms 
resulting from the MDDLA’s relaxed causation requirements do 
not apply in the context of a case like Muhs. 
Despite this difference, Ficano and Muhs have several 
important similarities. Both cases help further the universal 




141 American Trial Lawyers Assoc., Counsel Obtains Verdict Against 
Drug Dealer Whose customers Caused Fatal Automobile Wreck, LAW 





146 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b). 
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interest of providing victims of the illegal drug market with a 
remedy while deterring those who participate in the distribution 
of drugs. Further, the plaintiffs in both cases encountered the 
common problem of collecting the judgment from the liable 
defendants. Plaintiffs under the MDDLA can expect to have 
difficulty collecting judgments once a verdict has been reached 
because many defendants will not be able to satisfy a large 
award. However, with increased publicity and legislative support 
for the MDDLA, plaintiffs may begin to file suit against 
defendants more capable of fulfilling an adequate award. Even if 
a defendant is not capable of fully satisfying an award under a 
state’s DDLA, the statute provides incentives for defendants to 
identify other participants in the illegal drug market so that they 
may share liability. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MDDLA 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
serves as a check upon the authority of state legislatures to 
deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property.147 Accordingly, 
courts may review the fairness of procedures authorized by state 
legislation or the fairness of decisions in particular cases.148 
Additionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment provides that no person shall be “put in jeopardy of 
life or limb” for the same offense twice.149 Critics of the 
MDDLA raise two constitutional challenges based on these 
principles: one, that the Act’s statutory presumptions violate the 
procedural due process owed to defendants, and two, the Act 
violates the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double 
jeopardy by subjecting defendants to multiple punishments for 
the same offense.150 Despite these claims, case law, fundamental 
principles of procedural due process, and legislative history 
                                                          
147 See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943); RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWACK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.6 (3d ed. 2006). 
148 ROTUNDA & NOWACK, supra note 147. 
149 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
150 See, e.g., Stasell, supra note 6; Baar, supra note 6. 
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suggest that the MDDLA would survive such constitutional 
challenges. 
A.  The MDDLA Satisfies the Constitutional Requirements of 
the Due Process Clause 
When performing a due process analysis, courts must first 
determine the threshold issue of whether the state has deprived 
an individual of life, liberty, or property.151 Only after a court 
finds that the state has deprived an individual of any of these 
rights, must it then consider whether the procedure used by the 
state satisfies the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.152 To help articulate what these 
requirements are, the Supreme Court developed a balancing test 
in Matthews v. Eldridge.153 In Eldridge, the Court held that 
determining the constitutionality of a state’s process for 
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property required 
consideration of three factors: first, the private interest that will 
be affected by the state’s action; second, the possibility of 
mistaken deprivation weighed against the value of procedural 
alternatives; and third, the state’s interest, including the added 
burdens of requiring additional or substitute procedures.154 
Because judgments awarded under the MDDLA would 
clearly constitute a deprivation of property, the more critical 
determination is whether the MDDLA satisfies the Court’s three 
pronged balancing test handed down in Eldridge. Although even 
critics of the MDDLA concede that the Act provides defendants 
with three significant components of sufficient due process—
notice of being sued, a trial to determine issues of fact, and a 
neutral decision maker—procedural due process challenges arise 
in regard to the Act’s statutory presumption.155 
Applied to the MDDLA’s statutory presumption, the 
                                                          
151 ROTUNDA & NOWACK, supra note 147, § 17.1. 
152 Id. 
153 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
154 Id. 
155 See, e.g., Stasell, supra note 6; Baar, supra note 6. 
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Eldridge test requires courts to balance 1) a drug dealer’s private 
property interest; 2) the risk of a mistaken deprivation of the 
defendant’s property; and 3) the government’s interest in 
providing victims of the illegal drug trade with a civil remedy 
for their injuries.156 As discussed earlier, the MDDLA creates a 
presumption of liability of a defendant after the plaintiff shows 
that the defendant: 1) distributed illegal drugs in the user’s target 
community; 2) distributed the same type of illegal drug as was 
used by the drug user; and 3) was engaged in the distribution of 
drugs during the same time period in which the drugs were 
used.157 Additionally, a defendant is collaterally estopped from 
denying participation in the illegal drug market if he has been 
convicted under either state drug distribution laws or the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970.158 Opponents of the MDDLA claim that the Act fails 
under the Eldridge test because it “creates an irrational and 
irrebuttable presumption of liability once the plaintiff establishes 
[the] three elements.”159 
Admittedly, a statutory presumption cannot satisfy the due 
process clause without “some rational connection between the 
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.”160 However, 
opponents to the MDDLA support their position by erroneously 
contending that “a statutory presumption is thus invalid unless 
the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the 
proved fact.”161 Although this standard is applicable in some 
circumstances, the cited authority, Leary v. United States, does 
not apply to the MDDLA. Rather, Leary is clearly 
distinguishable as it considered the constitutionality of a criminal 
statutory presumption.162 Given the many procedural safeguards 
                                                          
156 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
157 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
159 Stasell, supra note 6 at 1047. 
160 See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 4 (1976); Tot 
v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).  
161 Stasell, supra note 6 (citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 
(1969)). 
162 Leary, 395 U.S. at 36. 
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provided to a criminal defendant that are not provided to a civil 
defendant, it follows that the Constitution would permit a lower 
standard for determining whether statutory presumptions in civil 
cases, as compared to those in criminal cases, satisfy the 
Eldridge test.163 
In 1988, the Supreme Court confirmed the notion that 
statutory presumptions in civil proceedings receive less scrutiny 
than statutory presumptions in criminal proceedings.164 In 
Feicock v. Feicock, a man was held in contempt for failure to 
comply with court-ordered child support.165 The majority 
focused primarily on the different burdens of proof, holding that 
California’s statutory presumption that an obligated parent 
remains able to make required child support payments would 
violate principles of procedural due process if applied in a 
criminal proceeding because the presumption “would undercut 
the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”166 
The Court emphasized that the relative high burden of proof 
required for criminal convictions prohibited the shifting of the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant, but “if applied in a civil 
proceeding, however, this particular statute would be 
constitutionally valid.”167 The Court further explained that if the 
state court only imposed civil remedies, “it would be improper 
to invalidate the result merely because the Due Process Clause, 
as applied in criminal proceedings, was not satisfied,” thereby 
recognizing the distinction between civil and criminal statutory 
presumptions.168 Consequently, any challenge to the 
constitutionality of the MDDLA’s statutory presumption based 
upon the standard used for criminal statutory presumptions is 
                                                          
163 For a more in-depth discussion of the litany of procedural safeguards 
afforded to criminal defendants but not provided to civil defendants, see, 
e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between 
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L. J. 1795, 1799 (1992). 
164 See Feicock v. Feicock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 637. 
167 Id. at 637-38. (citing Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75-76 (1948); 
Oriel v. Russel, 278 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1929)). 
168 Id. at 638 (emphasis added). 
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invalid because the MDDLA only provides for a civil remedy, 
and therefore, such challenges are in direct conflict with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Feicock. 
The elements required by the MDDLA’s statutory 
presumption, taken together with the Supreme Court’s decisions, 
state case law, and defendants’ ability to rebut the Act’s 
statutory presumption, indicate that the presumption passes 
constitutional muster under the Eldridge test.169 Even if the 
Court were to agree with critics’ claims that the Leary standard 
for rationality of statutory presumptions is applicable to civil 
proceedings, the elements a plaintiff must prove before imposing 
liability on a defendant under the Act’s statutory presumption 
clearly show that the presumed fact is “more likely than not” to 
have occurred. At a minimum, a defendant liable under the 
MDDLA must be shown to have distributed illegal drugs in the 
same target community as the user, to have distributed the same 
type of illegal drugs used by the user, and to have distributed 
drugs at the same time as when the user used drugs.170 
The proof of such facts unquestionably makes it more likely 
than not that the defendant contributed to the plaintiff’s harm by 
participating in the distribution of drugs to the user whose 
actions formed the basis for recovery. Therefore, the elements 
required for enforcement of the MDDLA’s presumption satisfy 
the Leary standard. The Court’s distinction between criminal and 
statutory presumptions demonstrates the Court’s determination 
that a civil defendant’s property interest may receive less 
protection than a criminal defendant’s liberty interest.171 As a 
result, the consideration of the second prong of the Eldridge 
test—the risk of erroneous deprivation of property—assumes 
greater significance in the determination of whether the 
MDDLA’s presumption is constitutional. 
Because the MDDLA allows the defendant to rebut the 
statutory presumption, the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
                                                          
169 See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334; Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 
468 (1943); Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 250-52 (1957). 
170 See MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b). 
171 See Feicock v. Feicock, 485 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1988).   
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property is not substantial enough to render the Act 
unconstitutional. Although plaintiffs under the MDDLA may 
impose liability upon defendants after proving three elements, 
any defendant, regardless of whether he has been convicted of a 
drug distribution offense, may offer evidence for the purpose of 
rebutting the presumption of liability.172 Critics of the Act assert 
that “the presumption of liability . . . is effectively 
irrebuttable,”173 but such claims lose sight of two important 
principles of the MDDLA. First, despite that a conviction for a 
drug distribution offense serves as prima facie evidence of a 
defendant’s participation in the illegal drug market for the two 
years preceding the date of the plaintiff’s injury, this provision 
only serves to collaterally estop defendants from denying having 
ever participated in the illegal drug market.174 Therefore, 
defendants under the MDDLA who have prior convictions for 
drug distribution offenses may still offer proof that they did not 
participate in the distribution of illegal drugs either during the 
two years preceding the date of the plaintiff’s injury or during 
the relevant time period during which the plaintiff’s injury 
occurred. Such an evidentiary showing would enable a defendant 
to effectively rebut the Act’s statutory presumption, allowing a 
reasonable jury to find in his favor. 
Second, the MDDLA’s critics also lose sight of the 
underlying principle that, because of the nature of the illicit drug 
trade, defendants brought into court via the MDDLA are in the 
best position to supply exculpatory evidence. Such a shift of the 
burden of persuasion would violate the Due Process Clause in a 
criminal proceeding, but may be constitutionally assigned to the 
civil defendant after the plaintiff has made a factual 
demonstration.175 Moreover, though the Supreme Court has held 
that there must be a rational connection between the facts proved 
and a statutory presumption for it to be considered valid, it has 
also held that courts may consider the “comparative convenience 
                                                          
172 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b), see 
also supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
173 Stasell, supra note 6, at 1049; see also Baar, supra note 6, at 193. 
174 MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b). 
175 Feicock, 485 U.S. at 637-38. 
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of producing evidence of the ultimate fact.”176 That defendants 
are better situated to provide evidence as to their liability carries 
considerable weight as to the determination that the Act’s 
presumption is rebuttable. Accordingly, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of property is outweighed by the government’s 
interest in providing victims of the illegal drug trade with an 
adequate and available civil remedy. 
Additional due process challenges arise because of the Act’s 
departure from traditional proximate cause requirements in favor 
of a risk-oriented approach to market share liability theory.177 
Nevertheless, the enactment of Dram Shop statutes and workers’ 
compensation laws, together with the Supreme Court’s repeated 
decisions to deny certiorari to cases permitting market share 
liability,178 provide a sound basis for the constitutionality of the 
MDDLA’s relaxation of proximate cause requirements. 
The constitutionality of state Dram Shop acts also lends 
support to the MDDLA. In Pierce v. Albanese, Connecticut’s 
Supreme Court considered whether the State’s Dram Shop Act 
violated the Due Process Clause of the federal and state 
Constitutions on the grounds that the statute imposed civil 
liability on defendants who served alcohol without requiring a 
causal connection between the sale of intoxicating liquor and the 
intoxication which caused the plaintiff’s injury.179 The plaintiff 
in Pierce brought suit against a tavern owner under 
Connecticut’s Dram Shop Act after being struck by an 
automobile operated by an intoxicated driver who had been sold 
                                                          
176 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). 
177 See, e.g., Stasell, supra note 6; Baar, supra note 6. For an 
explanation of the risk oriented approach to market share liability used by the 
MDDLA, see Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 166, 193-94 (1984), discussed supra 
notes 105-18. 
178 Meeks, supra note 20, at 344 (citing Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607 
P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 
(1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 826 (1984). 
179 144 Conn. 241 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 15 (1957). 
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alcohol at the defendant’s tavern.180 The Pierce court recognized 
that the Connecticut Dram Shop Act “created an action unknown 
to the common law.”181 Nonetheless, the court upheld the statute 
on the grounds that, through exercise of its police powers, a 
state may modify or remove traditional common law principles 
to provide damages for injuries without violating constitutional 
requirements.182 
The defendant in Pierce asserted that the statute violated the 
Due Process Clause as he should not be held liable absent a 
showing that the intoxicating liquor that he sold significantly 
contributed to the intoxication of the person whose conduct gave 
rise to the plaintiff’s claim.183 After determining that the statute 
was constitutional, the Pierce Court explained that “the statute 
does not require proof that the sale of intoxicating liquor 
produced or contributed to the intoxication of the person to 
whom it was sold.”184 Accordingly, after the plaintiff provided 
evidence that the driver to whom the liquor was sold was 
intoxicated, and that such intoxication played a role in the 
negligent operation of a vehicle, the Pierce Court upheld the 
trial court’s jury instructions and affirmed the jury’s verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff.185 
Most Dram Shop laws, including the one at issue in Pierce, 
parallel the MDDLA in a number of ways and represent a 
constitutionally permissible departure from the common law’s 
traditional causation principles.186 Most notably, the majority of 
                                                          
180 Id. at 244-45. 
181 Id. at 249 (citing Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 251 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 318 (1949); Beck v. 
Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 35 (1955); Tarwater v. Atlanta Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 
512 (1940); Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 203 (1936)). 
182 Feierstein, 222 Wis. at 250 (citing Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 
Conn. 143, 147 (1915); Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 377 (1928); Levy 
v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 337 (1928); Verrilli 
v. Damilowski, 140 Conn. 358, 360 (1953)). 
183 Id. at 254. 
184 Pierce v. Albanaese, 144 Conn. 241, 263 (1957), cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 15 (1957).  
185 Id. 
186 Courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of Dram Shop 
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Dram Shop Acts do not require the plaintiff to prove that the 
liquor provided by the defendant to the driver played a role in 
the driver’s intoxication.187 The Pierce court defended the 
constitutionality of such statutes: 
[I]f one desires to engage in the liquor business. . .he 
assumes of necessity the risk of a great variety of 
situations which could impose liability upon him. He 
is bound to presume that the liquor which he sells 
will be consumed sometime. The act does not impose 
absolute liability upon the [defendant] but leaves to 
him a number of defenses.188 
Similarly, drug dealers assume the risks associated with 
conducting their business, including liability for the damage or 
harm they may cause. The overwhelming support for the 
constitutionality of Dram Shop legislation lends considerable 
strength to the assertion that the MDDLA’s deviation from 
traditional causation requirements is constitutional. 
In addition to dram shop legislation, workers’ compensation 
laws also serve as an example of how legislatures may 
constitutionally modify or abolish specific fundamentals of tort 
liability.189 Under the common law, employees were generally 
                                                          
Acts. See, e.g. Pierce, 144 Conn. at 253 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles C’ty, 213 Cal. 596, 598 (1931)); Garrity v. Eiger, 272 
Ill. 127, 134 (1916), aff’d, 246 U.S. 97 (1918) (holding that “in view of the 
broad authority of the states over the liquor traffic, and the established right 
to prohibit or regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, we are unable to 
discover that there has been a deprivation of property rights in the legislation 
in question in violation of due process of law secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Bertholf v. O’Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 517 (1878); Kennedy v. 
Garrigan, 121 N.W. 783 (S.D. 1909). 
187 Pierce, 144 Conn. at 254. 
188 Id. at 252. 
189 Workers’ compensation statutes have generally been upheld as 
constitutional, particularly in the face of challenges brought under the Due 
Process Clause. See, e.g., Shaw v. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n., 69 
Ariz. 309 (1950); Khoury v. Carvel Homes South, Inc., 403 So.2d 1043 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 412 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1982); Walters 
v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485 (1954) (holding that Mississippi Workers’ 
Compensation Law does not violate Due Process Clause despite abrogating 
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unable to receive adequate awards for injuries resulting from 
their employer’s breach of duty because of the “unholy trinity” 
of defenses available to defendants: contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.190 It followed 
that many industrial injuries went uncompensated, thereby 
forcing the employee—the least-capable individual—to bear the 
resulting financial burden.191 The common law’s inability to 
impose liability onto employers induced extremely poor working 
conditions, inhumane practices, and most significantly, a lack of 
an incentive for employers to improve their work 
environments.192 Reluctant to take legislative matters into their 
own hands, the courts waited for legislatures to enact a change 
in the common law’s rules for injured employees.193 
Workers’ compensation statutes also parallel the MDDLA on 
statutory and public policy levels. Under these statutes, an 
employer is subject to liability for the injuries arising out of his 
enterprise, regardless of whether he or the injured employee was 
negligent.194 Put plainly, workers’ compensation laws allow 
recovery not only in cases in which the employer has not 
breached a duty to the employee (e.g. an unavoidable accident), 
but also in cases in which the employee’s own negligence was a 
factor in causing his injuries.195 Therefore, both workers’ 
compensation laws and the MDDLA deviate from the common 
law’s causation requirement in order to allow plaintiffs to 
overcome the obstacles to recovery that otherwise permit 
negligent defendants to avoid liability. 
While both the MDDLA and workers’ compensation laws 
provide a civil remedy for plaintiffs who have suffered a 
demonstrable harm, each scheme also creates an incentive for 
                                                          
right to bring suit for personal injury and subjecting employers to liability in 
the absence of neglect or fault). 
190 KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 568. 
191 Id. § 80 at 572. 
192 Id. § 80 at 573. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 See Walters, 220 Miss. at 507. See also KEETON ET. AL, supra note 
13, § 80, at 573. 
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defendants to refrain from tortious conduct. In the same way 
that workers’ compensation laws were enacted to make working 
conditions safer, the MDDLA represents an effort to decrease 
the prevalence of illegal drugs. Workers’ compensation acts rest 
upon the theory that “the cost of the product should bear the 
blood of the workman.”196 This theory holds that damages paid 
to injured employees should be absorbed by the employer as a 
cost of production, much like the servicing of machinery or 
other operating costs.197 As the employer assumes these costs, 
he eventually passes them onto the consumer in the form of 
higher prices.198 Similarly, the MDDLA has the potential to 
drive up drug dealers’ production costs by subjecting them to 
liability for their conduct, thereby raising the cost of illegal 
drugs for consumers. 
The MDDLA satisfies the constitutional requirements of the 
Due Process Clause for several reasons. First, the Supreme 
Court recognizes the distinction between criminal and civil 
statutory presumptions and provides that the burden of 
persuasion may be shifted to the defendant in a civil 
proceeding.199 Second, the Eldridge Court’s balancing test for 
determining the constitutionality of statutory presumptions 
indicates that the MDDLA’s presumption comports with due 
process. Consider the  application of the Eldridge test: the 
government’s compelling interest in providing an appropriate 
civil remedy for victims, defendants’ relatively low property 
interests, and the rebuttable nature of the MDDLA’s statutory 
presumption all weigh in favor of upholding the Act’s 
presumption. Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that “due 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands.”200 Therefore, given the 
                                                          
196 KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 573 (quoting Francis Bohlen, 
A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. 
REV. 328, 401, 517 (1912)). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 See Feicock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); see also supra notes 162-68 and 
accompanying text. 
200 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
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obstacles to recovery that injured plaintiffs face due to the 
secretive nature of the illegal drug trade, the MDDLA’s 
legislative deviation from traditional causation principles is 
within the limits of the Constitution. 
B.  The MDDLA Does Not Violate the Fifth Amendment’s 
Protection Against Double Jeopardy 
Although the MDDLA imposes civil liability on some 
defendants who may have already been subject to criminal 
liability, the Act does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court has consistently held that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects only against the 
imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same 
offense.”201 Therefore, because the MDDLA inflicts a civil, 
rather than criminal punishment, it passes muster under the Fifth 
Amendment. Nevertheless, the MDDLA’s opponents claim that 
the Act violates defendants’ protection against double jeopardy 
because the statute intends to punish and deter defendants.202 In 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v. United 
States, however, the MDDLA survives constitutional scrutiny 
under the Fifth Amendment’s protection against Double 
Jeopardy. 
In Hudson, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Double Jeopardy Clause protected three defendants from being 
indicted for violating federal banking statutes after the 
government had already imposed monetary penalties in a civil 
suit arising from the same conduct. The Hudson Court 
ultimately determined that the monetary penalties enforced by 
the government in the civil proceeding were in fact civil, and 
therefore did not render the subsequent criminal prosecution 
violative of the Fifth Amendment.203 Most significantly, 
                                                          
471, 481 (1972)). 
201 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (emphasis in original) 
(citing United States ex. Rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943); 
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)). 
202 See, e.g., Stasell, supra note 6; Baar, supra note 6. 
203 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96. 
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however, the Court abandoned its method of analysis in Halper 
largely on the grounds that the Halper Court failed to determine 
the threshold issue of whether a penalty was criminal in nature 
before applying the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause 
to the sanction at issue.204 
Hudson held that the Halper Court improperly ignored 
traditional double jeopardy doctrine.205 The defendant in Halper 
asserted his Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy 
after the government brought a civil action against him under the 
False Claims Act for conduct that had already resulted in a two 
year prison sentence.206 The Halper Court, determining whether 
the punishment imposed was civil or criminal, considered only 
whether the sanctions were so inconsistent with the harm caused 
that it represented a criminal punishment.207 Halper over-
emphasized this single factor, essentially making it the 
determinative factor.208 In response, Hudson held that “no one 
factor should be considered controlling as they ‘may often point 
in differing directions.’”209 
The Supreme Court’s test for determining whether a 
punishment is criminal or civil requires consideration of two 
questions.210 First, courts must ask whether the legislature either 
expressly or implicitly intended the sanction to be classified as a 
civil or criminal punishment.211 Second, even it is found that the 
legislature intended a civil punishment, courts must determine 
whether the sanction is so punitive as to transform it into a 
                                                          
204 Id. at 96, 101. 
205 Id. at 101. 
206 Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-38. 
207 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101. Although Halper violated the False Claims 
Act on 65 different instances, thereby subjecting him to liability for a penalty 
of $130,000, his conduct actually defrauded the government of approximately 
$600. Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 
(1963)). 
210 Id. at 99. 
211 Id. (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)). 
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criminal punishment.212 Considering the first question, the 
legislative intent of the MDDLA is clear. Much like Congress’ 
enactment of the relevant statute in Hudson,213 the MDDLA 
expressly provides that any monetary penalties imposed under its 
legislative scheme constitute civil remedies that may be obtained 
via civil proceedings. 214 
In answering the Hudson test’s second question, several 
factors provide “useful guideposts,”215 including: 1) to what 
extent, if any, the penalty involves an affirmative restraint such 
as imprisonment; 2) whether the penalty has historically been 
considered a punishment; 3) whether the sanction is imposed 
only after a finding of scienter; 4) whether the penalty 
encourages the traditional goals associated with criminal 
punishments such as retribution and deterrence; 5) whether the 
conduct giving rise to the penalty constitutes a criminal offense; 
6) whether there is a possible alternative purpose for the 
penalty; and 7) whether the sanction is excessive with regard to 
the alternative purpose.216 Additionally, Hudson explained that 
the factors must be applied to the statute on its face, and that 
“only the clearest proof” enables a court to convert what the 
legislature intended as a civil remedy into a criminal 
punishment.217 
Much like the civil penalty at issue in Hudson, the civil 
remedies imposed under the MDDLA are not so punitive as to 
assume a criminal classification. The MDDLA seeks to provide 
a civil remedy to plaintiffs who have suffered a demonstrable 
harm, thereby compelling liable defendants to pay civil 
damages.218 Any affirmative restraint resulting from the 
                                                          
212 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99; 118 S.Ct. 488, 493 
(1997) (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49; Rex Trailer Co. 
v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)). 
213 Id. at 103. 
214 See Bent et al., supra note 45. 
215 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. 
216 Id. (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169). 
217 Id. at 100 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169; Ward, 448 
U.S. at 249). 
218 Bent et al., supra note 45. 
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defendant’s conduct arises during a separate criminal 
prosecution. Additionally, monetary penalties have not 
historically been interpreted as constituting criminal 
punishments.219 Moreover, the MDDLA furthers two goals 
traditionally associated with criminal punishments—retribution 
and deterrence. However, the Court recognized that “all civil 
penalties have some deterrent effect,” and “if a sanction must be 
‘solely’ remedial (i.e. entirely non-deterrent) to avoid 
implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause, then no civil penalties 
are beyond the scope of the Clause.”220 The Hudson Court 
explained that the deterrent effect or purpose of a civil sanction 
was insufficient proof that a civil penalty should be considered a 
criminal punishment because deterrence may permissibly serve 
as a goal of both criminal and civil liability.221 Therefore, the 
MDDLA’s secondary goal of deterrence does not render it 
violative of the protection against double jeopardy. 
The MDDLA undoubtedly subjects defendants to civil 
liability for conduct that constitutes a criminal offense, but 
challenges to the Act’s constitutionality lose sight of the fact that 
there is a rational alternative purpose to the legislation, namely 
providing victims of the illegal drug trade with a remedial 
course of action.222 Under the Hudson test, this alternative 
purpose supports the proposition that monetary penalties 
imposed under the MDDLA are not so punitive as to transform 
the civil remedy into a criminal punishment. Moreover, the 
Hudson Court explained that civil liability arising from the same 
conduct that gives rise to criminal liability does not necessarily 
                                                          
219 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997). 
220 Id. at 102 (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 
U.S. 767, 777 (1994) (holding that the presence of a deterrent purpose or 
effect was not determinative when considering if a sanction violated the 
Double Jeopardy Clause)). 
221 Id. at 105 (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) 
(rejecting the argument that civil forfeitures violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause)). See also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (holding 
that civil forfeiture’s deterrent purpose is separate from any punitive 
purpose). 
222 Bent et al., supra note 45. 
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cause the monetary sanctions to assume a criminal nature, 
particularly when considering whether the sanction constitutes a 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.223 
After applying the factors set out in Hudson, it is clear that 
the civil remedy provided by the MDDLA does not amount to 
the clearest proof required by the Court to transform what was 
intended as a monetary sanction into a criminal punishment.224 
The legislative intent and insufficiently punitive aspects satisfy 
the standard established by the Supreme Court in Hudson. 
Therefore, the MDDLA does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against double jeopardy. 
CONCLUSION 
The MDDLA should be perceived as another legislative 
innovation created to help cure a social injustice presented under 
the common law. In addition to the need for remedial legislation 
to solve the causation difficulties victims face, a variety of 
different jurisdictions have accepted theories of market share 
liability. Most notably, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied 
certiorari to appellants seeking to overturn decisions that have 
imposed liability via market share liability, including the risk-
oriented approach to market share liability established in 
Collins.225 The Supreme Court’s recurring unwillingness to 
overturn decisions imposing liability based upon market share 
liability theory is particularly supportive of the MDDLA’s 
constitutionality as the Act employs virtually the same market 
share liability model as was considered by the Collins Court. 
                                                          
223 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105 (citing Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292; United 
States v. Dixon 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (disavowing the same-conduct test 
in the context of double jeopardy violations)). 
224 Id. at 100 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169; Ward, 448 
U.S. at 249). 
225 See Meeks, supra note 20, at 344 (citing Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607 
P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 
(1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 826 (1984)). 
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Moreover, the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes 
and Dram Shop acts represent instances in which the legislature 
recognized a problem that the common law was ill-equipped to 
solve, and in response, enacted legislation so as to provide 
victims with a civil remedy. Both types of legislation have been 
held constitutionally valid across almost all jurisdictions,226 and 
the MDDLA seeks to serve the same types of policy interests as 
these well-accepted statutes.  
Last, in light of the Court’s clear distinction between 
criminal and civil statutory presumptions,227 and the rebuttable 
nature of the MDDLA’s presumption of liability, the MDDLA 
satisfies the balancing of interests provided for in the Eldridge 
test. Furthermore, in addition to allowing for civil sanctions to 
serve deterrent purposes, the Hudson Court also required the 
clearest proof that the penalty imposed was so punitive as to 
alter what the legislature intended as a civil remedy into a 
criminal punishment, thereby overturning Halper.228 As applied 
to the MDDLA, the Act’s clear intent for the penalty to be civil, 
along with its insufficiently punitive nature under the factors laid 
out in Hudson, demonstrate that it does not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. Taken together, these considerations heavily 
support the constitutionality of the MDDLA. 
The potential effects of the MDDLA are also encouraging. 
At the heart of the MDDLA is the premise that participants in 
the illegal drug market are heavily motivated by the opportunity 
to acquire wealth.229 Despite a highly skewed wage system, 
economists claim that many low-level drug dealers enter the 
illegal drug trade at a young age for the same reasons that small-
town prom queens move to Hollywood and high school 
quarterbacks lift weights at 5 a.m.: “they all want to succeed in 
an extremely competitive field in which, if you reach the top, 
                                                          
226 See supra notes 186, 189. 
227 See Feicock v. Feicock, 485 U.S. 624, 637-38 (citing Maggio, 333 
U.S. at 75-76 (1948); Oriel , 278 U.S. at 364-65 (1929)). 
228 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (1980)). 
229 STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A 
ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 96 (Harper 
Collins 2005). 
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you are paid a fortune.”230 Although the rank and file members 
of an illegal drug operation stand to make relatively low wages, 
mid-to-upper level dealers can acquire sizeable salaries.231 In 
fact, a field study of an illegal drug operation that was operating 
out of a large, industrial city recorded one of the operation’s 
mid-level leaders as having earned monthly revenues of 
approximately $32,000—an annual total of $384,000.232 After 
spending funds on business costs such as weapons, wholesale 
drugs, and payments to higher-level leaders, this mid-level 
leader was left with monthly profits of approximately $8,500, or 
an annual salary of just over $100,000.233 Setting aside the fact 
that this income is, tax-free, the data for this mid-level leader 
nonetheless represents what many entrants into the illegal drug 
market strive for—affluence.234 With high-level dealers earning 
upwards of $500,000 annually,235 the MDDLA serves as an 
appropriate solution for enabling plaintiffs to subject wealthy 
drug dealers to liability, thereby permitting victims to receive an 
adequate remedy while providing a deterrent to future entrants 
into the illegal drug market. 
Moreover, despite often severe sentencing guidelines, 
additional data indicates that criminal punishments are 
insufficient to serve as deterrents to participating in the illegal 
drug market.236 One study reported overwhelmingly high risks 
of arrest and serious bodily injury to its dealers, and yet, the 
drug ring enjoyed an over-supply of labor.237 The most alarming 
statistic was that one out of every four of the drug ring’s dealers 
                                                          
230 Id. at 94-95. 
231 Id. at 97. 
232 Id. at 90-93. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 96.  
235 STEPHEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A 
ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 92 (Harper 
Collins 2005).  
236 Id. at 94. 
237 Id. Amongst each of the drug ring’s members, the mean number of 
times arrested was 5.9, and the mean number of times having suffered non-
fatal wounds or injuries was 2.4. Id. 
NICK MOST LAST SECOND EDITS EVER.DOC 7/19/2007 8:44 PM 
1374 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
had been killed since the inception of the operation.238 Steven 
Levitt and Stephen Dubner effectively highlight the significance 
of this statistic by comparing it to death row inmates’ chances of 
survival. For instance, in 2003, Texas—responsible for the most 
executions of any state in the U.S.—had over 500 prisoners 
awaiting execution on death row.239 Of these 500 prisoners, 24 
were executed in 2003, equaling approximately five percent of 
the state’s death row inmates.240 Evidently, drug dealers in the 
operation that was the subject of the economist’s study had a 
much higher risk of death than prisoners awaiting execution on 
Texas’ death row, yet market forces and an over-abundance of 
labor continually allowed the drug operation’s leaders to pay 
low-level dealers comparably insignificant salaries.241 
This data emphasizes the need for legislatures to utilize 
innovative schemes like the MDDLA in order to provide an 
adequate deterrent for those who consider becoming drug 
dealers, as well as the necessity for affording victims of the 
illegal trade a satisfactory remedy. That legislatures have 
historically enacted statutes deviating from traditional common 
law principles of liability in order to aid injured plaintiffs is 
strong support for the enactment of the legislation based upon 
the MDDLA. Not only are future drug dealers lured by the 
prospect of earning high salaries, many current dealers are 
capable of paying substantial judgments to injured plaintiffs. For 
these reasons, the MDDLA is an appropriate and constitutionally 
sound legislative proposal. 
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